Snobbery at the End of History: Kojève’s Last Formal Value

## **Introduction: Can Form Alone Preserve Humanity?** Among Alexandre Kojève's many provocative ideas, few are as curious—or as misunderstood—as his suggestion that **snobbery may become the defining virtue of post-historical humanity**. At first glance, the claim appears almost satirical. How could one of the twentieth century's most influential Hegelian philosophers conclude that snobbery, of all things, might save mankind from animality? Yet behind this seemingly frivolous proposal lies one of Kojève's deepest philosophical questions. If history has ended, if political struggle, religion, ideology, and labour no longer define human existence, what remains that is uniquely human? Kojève's answer emerges directly from his interpretation of Hegel, Nietzsche and Heidegger. Modern technological civilization eliminates the great historical projects that once distinguished humanity from nature. Liberal democracy, capitalism and scientific rationality satisfy material needs but threaten to eliminate the very negativity through which humanity historically constituted itself. Without struggle, risk and historical action, man appears destined to become what Kojève famously called an "animal." His encounter with Japan in 1959 radically modified this bleak conclusion. There he believed he had discovered a civilization already living beyond history while preserving forms of distinctly human existence through ritual, style and formalized behaviour. It is within this context that Kojève introduces the surprising notion of **snobbery as a formal value**. ## **History After History** Kojève's entire philosophy rests upon the claim that history is finite. History begins with the struggle for recognition and ends once universal recognition has been institutionalized within the universal and homogeneous state. Liberal democracy, technological administration and global capitalism gradually dissolve the great ideological conflicts that once propelled civilization. Unlike many Marxists, Kojève insists that after the end of history wars may continue, revolutions may still occur, and political crises will certainly persist. Yet these events no longer possess genuine historical significance. They merely extend an already completed political form across the remaining regions of the world. Democratization, communization, decolonization and globalization become administrative rather than historical processes. This perspective separates Kojève from both Heidegger and much of the New Left. Whereas Heidegger doubts the rationality of technological modernity itself, Kojève insists that the completed historical process finally allows philosophy to understand humanity rationally. History becomes intelligible precisely because it has reached its conclusion. Yet this triumph immediately creates a new dilemma. If humanity has achieved complete satisfaction, what remains to motivate human existence? What distinguishes post-historical man from a highly intelligent animal? This question becomes the central problem of Kojève's later philosophy. ## **The Threat of Re-Animalization** Kojève's answer is famously pessimistic. Once labour, politics and struggle disappear, many specifically human activities lose their historical function. Art may continue, but only as decoration. Language may continue, but increasingly resembles conditioned reflexes. Music survives, but resembles birds singing. Architecture continues, but resembles nests built by animals. Human discourse itself risks becoming as automatic as the communication systems of bees. These provocative analogies are not intended literally. Kojève is describing a civilization where creative activity no longer transforms history but merely reproduces established forms. Human beings remain biologically human while gradually losing the negativity that historically defined humanity. Importantly, Kojève distinguishes **contentment** from **happiness**. Post-historical humanity will probably be materially satisfied. It will enjoy comfort, peace and prosperity. Yet satisfaction alone does not constitute genuinely human existence. The problem therefore becomes philosophical rather than economic. If humanity has eliminated every historical challenge, can genuinely human freedom still exist? ## **Japan and the Discovery of Formal Values** Kojève believed he discovered an unexpected answer during his visit to Japan. Unlike Europe, Japan appeared to him as a civilization that had lived for centuries in conditions resembling the end of history. Internal peace, elaborate ritual and highly formalized social behaviour had produced cultural practices apparently detached from economic necessity, political struggle or religious salvation. The tea ceremony. No theatre. Haiku. Ceremonial etiquette. Samurai codes of honour. These activities fascinated Kojève because they seemed to possess almost no instrumental purpose. They existed simply because they were performed beautifully. This observation led him toward one of his most original concepts: **formal value**. A formal value derives its importance not from practical utility, moral truth or historical necessity but from the perfection of its form. The value lies in *how* something is done rather than *why* it is done. The Japanese tea ceremony does not satisfy hunger. Haiku does not transform political institutions. No theatre does not solve economic problems. Yet each preserves a uniquely human style of existence. Here Kojève introduces his famous notion of **snobbery**. ## **Is Snobbery a Formal Value?** For Kojève, snobbery should not be understood merely as vanity or social pretension. Instead, it describes the human desire to distinguish oneself through purely formal differences. A snob chooses because something possesses style rather than utility. The distinction itself becomes valuable. In this sense snobbery becomes detached from wealth, power or political domination. It functions as a mechanism through which individuals preserve individuality within an increasingly homogeneous society. The post-historical snob does not seek conquest. He seeks distinction. Not substantive superiority but formal uniqueness. Lifestyle replaces ideology. Taste replaces politics. Style replaces history. This explains why Kojève associates snobbery with Japanese culture rather than European aristocracy. Japanese formalism democratizes distinction. Anyone may perfect ritual, etiquette, aesthetic refinement or disciplined behaviour regardless of historical importance. Snobbery therefore becomes an egalitarian aristocracy of form. Its object is not domination but elegance. ## **Heidegger and the Technicalization of Language** This interpretation acquires additional significance when read alongside Heidegger's late reflections on language. In *On the Way to Language*, Heidegger warns that modern linguistics increasingly becomes **metalinguistics**, reducing language to an instrument for transmitting information. His famous observation is striking: > "Metalanguage and Sputnik. Metalinguistics and rocketry are the same." For Heidegger, language is no longer the house of Being but merely another technological system. Communication becomes information processing. Language becomes administration. Meaning becomes operational efficiency. Kojève's Japanese formalism can be understood as one possible response to precisely this technological transformation. If modern language becomes purely instrumental, formal linguistic practices preserve dimensions of existence inaccessible to technological rationality. Haiku. Silence. Ceremony. Gesture. Politeness. All resist complete instrumentalization because their value lies in form itself rather than informational content. In this sense, formal values constitute a resistance to what Heidegger called the technological enframing (*Gestell*) of language. ## **Toward a Science of Snobbery** Kojève's proposal ultimately raises a remarkable philosophical possibility. Could there exist a genuine **science of snobbery**? Such a discipline would investigate forms of human distinction that possess no practical function yet preserve uniquely human existence. It would study fashion without reducing it to economics. Etiquette without reducing it to sociology. Art without reducing it to ideology. Taste without reducing it to consumption. Its object would be formal values themselves. Whether this project ultimately succeeds remains uncertain. If snobbery truly lacks substantive content, it risks degenerating into empty aestheticism. If, however, formal refinement itself embodies genuine human excellence, then snobbery becomes something much richer than vanity. It becomes a philosophy of civilization after history. ## **Conclusion: The Last Human Style** The question "Is snobbery a formal value?" proves far deeper than it initially appears. For Kojève, the issue concerns nothing less than humanity's survival after the completion of history. If politics, religion, labour and ideology no longer provide historical purpose, humanity must discover new forms of distinction. Japan offered Kojève one possible model. Formal values preserve humanity not because they change the world but because they transform existence into style. Whether one accepts this conclusion or not, Kojève's insight remains remarkably contemporary. As modern societies become increasingly standardized, algorithmic and bureaucratic, distinction increasingly migrates from politics toward aesthetics, lifestyle, ritual and symbolic identity. The danger, however, remains equally evident. Formal values can preserve civilization only so long as form continues to express genuine human creativity. Once style becomes merely another commodity or another bureaucratic performance, even snobbery itself becomes standardized. The ultimate question therefore remains unresolved: **Can humanity survive historically after history, or does the preservation of form ultimately require the continual creation of new substance?**